This paper examines how a firm can strategically use sellouts to influence consumers' beliefs about its product's popularity. A monopolist faces a market of conformist consumers, whose willingness to pay is increasing in their beliefs about aggregate demand. Consumers are broadly rational but have limited strategic reasoning about the firm's incentives. Formally, I apply the concept of a 'cursed equilibrium', where consumers neglect how the firm's chosen actions might be correlated with its private information about demand. I show that in a dynamic setting, the firm may choose its price and capacity so as to generate sellouts, specifically to exploit consumers' limited reasoning. It does so to effectively conceal unfavorable information from consumers about past demand in a way that increases future profits. Sellouts tend to occur when demand is low, rather than high, and may be accompanied by introductory pricing. The analysis also demonstrates that the firm's ability to mislead some consumers always benefits certain others, and can result in higher overall consumer surplus. Keywords: sellouts, conformity, bounded rationality JEL classification: D91, D42, D83 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0187
Introduction
One important concern that can influence consumer behavior is the desire to conform (Lascu and Zinkhan 1999) . Many consumers prefer to buy products that they believe are popular, either in certain reference groups, or across the general population (Vigneron and Johnson 1999; Chaudhuri and Majumdar 2006) . Consumer research suggests that such group influence can be particularly relevant for products that are conspicuous or that have high social visibility (Bearden and Etzel 1982; Fisher and Price 1992; Grimm, Agrawal, and Richardson 1999) . For firms selling such products, a relevant issue is how group influence, and consumers' desire to fit in, may interact with their strategic and marketing activities.
Theoretical work in both marketing and economics has examined this very issue, looking at consumers whose willingness to pay is increasing in aggregate demand, and showing how advertising and pricing may encourage bandwagon behavior (Becker 1991; Karni and Levin 1994; Jain 2005a, 2005b; Halbheer 2011, 2012) . 1 But this work on consumer conformity has largely neglected an issue that appears important in practice: sellouts.
Sellouts are often emphasized by consumers and firms alike. For example, fans in professional sports actively discuss and compare the consecutive sellout streaks of different teams. 2 The Boston Red Sox marked the occasion of 600 straight sellouts at Fenway Park with a ceremony where principal owner John W. Henry threw 600 commemorative baseballs into the crowd. 3 Concert promoters putting new tickets on sale often prominently display information on sold out performances.
Intuitively, conformist consumers may react favorably to a sellout if it suggests something positive about product popularity. Moreover, in many cases, consumers who observe a sellout may not be able to observe the exact extent of excess demand. People walking past a restaurant may well observe the number of customers inside, and whether there are any free tables, but not whether earlier arrivals were turned away due to lack of space. Customers looking to make reservations for high-end restaurants who discover all tables are booked may also have limited information about excess demand. 4 Consumers buying concert tickets can often observe whether sellouts occurred for previous shows, or whether a limited number of presale tickets for that particular date have already sold out, but not necessarily how many people wanted to buy. 5 Attendance figures and sellouts for professional sports are routinely reported in the press, but the extent of any excess demand is not.
I develop a theoretical model to help shed light on how sellouts can influence conformist consumers, focusing on these types of applications: restaurants, concerts, sporting events, and other performances. In line with the above discussion, I assume that consumers can observe firm capacity and earlier sales, but not the extent A variety of other reasons for sellouts and rationing have been explored in the literature. Papanastasiou, Bakshi, and Savva (2014) assume that boundedly rational period-2 consumers update their beliefs about quality based on reports from period-1 buyers. The firm restricts period-1 sales to particularly high types to obtain better reports. Denicolo and Garella (1999) suggest that a durable-goods monopolist may want to ration some high-valuation consumers in order to commit to a higher future price. DeSerpa and Faith (1996) explore how rationing may help serve low-valuation consumers who exert positive consumption externalities on other buyers. Becker (1991) also considers conformists whose willingness to pay is increasing in aggregate demand, but in a static setting without demand uncertainty. He shows that a capacity-constrained firm may refrain from increasing its price in the face of excess demand, if consumer conformism leads demand to be upward sloping.
The analysis here differs from earlier work on consumer conformism in focusing on sellouts, viewing capacity as a strategic choice, and considering partial consumer sophistication. The specific approach I take to partial sophistication, of cursed equilibrium, can help explain otherwise curious behavior such as the winner's curse in auctions and trade in markets with adverse selection (Eyster and Rabin 2005; Spiegler 2011) . 12 Lovallo (2012, 2013) find evidence of related limited reasoning in the movie industry, where consumers fail to take into account that studios have a particular incentive to shield low-quality films from review.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 presents an illustrative example, and Section 4 follows with the general analysis. Section 5 addresses issues of robustness and Section 6 then concludes. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
The Model
In each period t∈{1,2}, a monopolist faces a measure m∈ [0, 1] of consumers with unit demand, where the market size m is drawn from an atomless distribution F with full support on [0, 1] . Period-t consumers can buy in period t or take their outside option, of value zero. The payoff from buying at price is
Buying yields an intrinsic payoff, represented by a consumer's type θ, uniformly distributed on Θ = [−(1 − ), ], with A∈(0,1). Buying also yields a social payoff that arises from consumer conformism. Specifically, the social payoff in period t is proportional to aggregate demand in that period, , which reflects the idea that conformists care about product popularity. The parameter λ > 0 captures the importance of this social payoff. 13 The timing of the game is as follows. At t = 0, nature draws the value of m, which is observed by the firm and a fraction (1 − ) ∈ [0, 1) of consumers. I say these consumers are informed and that others are uninformed, where being informed is uncorrelated with a consumer's type. At t = 1, the firm sets capacity ∈ ℝ + and price 1 ∈ ℝ + , and both are publicly revealed. Period-1 consumers simultaneously choose whether to buy and then leave the market. Sales 1 = { 1 , } are publicly revealed, where 1 is the demand implied by consumers' purchase decisions. At t = 2, under static pricing, the firm must maintain its price 1 , whereas under dynamic pricing it can set price 2 ∈ ℝ + . 14 Period-2 consumers then simultaneously choose whether to buy, with resulting demand 2 and sales 2 = { 2 , }. Payoffs are then realized and the game ends. The above timing, where period-1 consumers leave the market at the end of period 1, reflects the idea that consumers cannot engage in strategic delay. One interpretation is that period-1 consumers are myopic, and do not consider the possibility of delay due to their limited sophistication. Another is that they have an urgent need for the product or a suitable alternative. They either buy from the firm or purchase a default option, and cannot reenter the market in the short run. 15 For example, customers might approach a restaurant and dine there if tables are available, and otherwise settle on dining somewhere else, rather than postpone their meal to a later date.
I normalize production costs to zero and assume that the firm does not face any costs related to setting capacity. The latter assumption ensures that sellouts will not occur simply because low capacity allows the firm to save on costs. Let ≥ 0 denote the discount factor, so profits are
A strategy for the firm is a rule specifying, for each m∈ [0, 1] , a choice of K and 1 , along with (under dynamic pricing) a choice of 2 conditional on 1 ∈ [0, ]. A strategy for an uninformed period-1 consumer is a rule specifying whether to buy given his type, θ, and given K and 1 . A strategy for an informed period-1 consumer consists of such a decision rule for each m∈ [0, 1] . Similarly, a strategy for an uninformed period-2 consumer is a rule specifying whether to buy given his type θ, and given K, 1 , 1 , and (under dynamic pricing) 2 . A strategy for an informed period-2 consumer consists of such a decision rule for each m∈ [0, 1] .
I look for a cursed equilibrium where the firm's strategy is optimal, in the sense of maximizing eq. (2), given the strategies of consumers; each consumer's strategy is optimal given other consumers' strategies, the strategy of the firm, and his beliefs about the market size; and uninformed consumers' beliefs about the market size follow from Bayes' rule in all respects save one: they neglect any correlation between the realized market size and the firm's equilibrium actions. Specifically, let ℙ( , 1 | ) denote the conditional probability that the firm sets K and 1 in equilibrium, given market size m. Consumers believe this probability actually equals ℙ( , 1 ) = ∫ 1 0 ℙ( , 1 | ) ( ), the unconditional equilibrium probability of observing K and 1 . Similarly, under dynamic pricing, consumers believe that ℙ( 2 | , 1 , 1 , ) equals ℙ( 2 | , 1 , 1 ), the equilibrium probability of observing 2 , conditional only on K, 1 and 1 .
Illustrative Example
The following example illustrates how the firm may benefit from strategically using sellouts to mislead consumers about product popularity. In this example, (i) all consumers are uninformed, α = 1; (ii) the market size can take on one of two values, ∈ { , }, where 0 < < < 1 and ( = ) ≡ ∈ (0, 1); and (iii) the firm engages in static pricing, 1 = 2 ≡ . 16 Willingness to pay is increasing in type, so consumer behavior follows a threshold structure. Consumer i will demand a unit of the product if and only if her intrinsic payoff from buying, , exceeds a threshold value, * . This threshold will depend on the price and on consumer beliefs about demand, which in turn depend on beliefs about the market size.
Let µ denote the probability that consumer i ascribes to the market being large, = . Consumer i is indifferent about buying if and only if = * , so eq. (1) 
The left-hand-side denotes the intrinsic payoff from buying for the threshold type, and the right-hand-side denotes the difference between the price and the expected social payoff from buying.
Given critical type * , a fraction ( − * ) of consumers want to buy, since θ is uniformly distributed on [−(1 − ), ]. Demand is therefore ( ) = ( − * ), for ∈ { , }. Substituting into eq. (3) and grouping common terms yields * = − [ + (1 − ) ]( − * ).
Solving explicitly for * and substituting into ( ) = ( − * ) gives
which is increasing in beliefs µ. Consumers who believe the market is large expect that buyers will enjoy a high social payoff, due to high demand. This pushes up their willingness to pay and itself makes demand increase.
In a cursed equilibrium, consumers do not infer anything directly from observing price and capacity, so period-1 consumers' beliefs about the market size are given by the prior, µ = r. Period-1 demand is therefore
Period-2 consumers' beliefs will depend on the period-1 market outcome. Following excess capacity, 1 < , consumers realize there is a unique level of demand consistent with observed sales, since quantity demanded must equal the observed quantity sold, 1 ( ) = 1 . They can use eq. (5) to infer the true market size, ∈ { , }, so that eq. (4) implies
Following a sellout, period-2 consumers observe 1 = , and only infer that demand must at least weakly exceed capacity, 1 ( ) ≥ . If capacity and price were sufficiently low, ≤ 1 ( ), then period-2 consumers maintain their prior beliefs, because a sellout would have occurred for either market size. If instead > 1 ( ), then consumers correctly infer that the market is large, since only a large market could have led to a sellout. It follows that period-2 demand is
Comparing eqs (7) with (6) shows that a sellout can make demand higher than it would be following excess capacity, but only if the market is small. A sellout essentially hides the small market size from period-2 consumers and leads them to overestimate demand. As a result, they also overestimate the social payoff from buying, which increases their willingness to pay. 17 It follows that when the market is large, the firm chooses to have excess capacity in period 1. Demand increases over time as period-2 consumers infer the true market size, where the firm sets capacity sufficiently high to serve all these consumers. Specifically, given eqs (5) and (6), the firm sets = /2, along with ≥ 2 ( | 1 ( ) < ) > 1 ( ), evaluated at = /2. A period-1 sellout would have left the firm unable to increases sales over time because its capacity constraint would bind. Moreover, a sellout would not have generated any higher period-2 demand, since consumers already make the best possible inference after observing excess capacity.
When the market is small, the firm instead sets capacity equal to period-1 demand and sells out. Period-2 consumers observe the sellout and maintain their prior beliefs, and so overestimate both the market size and the social payoff from buying. The firm's capacity constraint binds and sales cannot increase over time. But the sellout still benefits the firm, since sales do not decrease over time, as they would had consumers observed excess capacity and realized that the market was small. Specifically, the firm finds it optimal to set = /2 and = 2 ( | 1 ( ) ≥ ) = 1 ( ) and sell out in both periods. The link between sellouts and low demand is driven by consumers' limited strategic reasoning. As in the general analysis, consumers react favorably to a sellout, as it shows that demand must at least weakly exceed capacity. The firm particularly benefits from this inference when demand is low as a sellout then hides unfavorable information. This gives the firm an incentive to strategically sell out to mislead consumers about product popularity. Consumers do not take into account that the firm may be acting strategically, and that its choice of capacity may itself signal information about demand, which is what allows them to be misled.
General Analysis
The main goal of this section is to describe the firm's equilibrium behavior, focusing on the strategic use of sellouts to mislead consumers. Just as for the illustrative example, I will show how demand depends on consumer beliefs about the market size, how these beliefs relate to the firm's strategic choices, and how this in turn can generate incentives for the firm to sell out.
As in Section 3, for any given price and expectations about demand, a consumer demands a unit of the product if and only if his intrinsic payoff from buying exceeds a threshold value. Specifically, let and denote period-t demand from informed and uninformed consumers, given price , and given uninformed consumer beliefs about the market size, which I denote by the cumulative distribution function . Using eq.
(1), write
where an informed consumer buys if and only if ∈ [ , ] , and an uninformed consumer buys if and only if ∈ [ , ] . The critical value for informed consumers, , depends on actual demand, because informed consumers can infer demand from the observed market size. The critical value for uninformed consumers, , depends on expected demand, so eq. (9) integrates over all possible values of the market size, m∈ [0, 1] , given uninformed consumer beliefs.
Intrinsic willingness to pay is uniformly distributed on [−(1− ), ], so demand from the (1− ) informed consumers is (1 − ) ( − ), and demand from the αm uninformed consumers is ( − ). Then eqs (8) and (9) imply
This system of equations has a unique solution, which defines a unique demand function for each group of consumers. I present these demand functions in Lemma 1. In order to ease the statement of the lemma, define
whose value depends on uninformed consumers' beliefs, , and which satisfies 1 < ( ) < 1 1− .
Lemma 1.
For any given price and uninformed-consumer beliefs , demand from uninformed consumers is
and demand from informed consumers is
] .
The first term in each expression for demand is the measure of consumers whose intrinsic payoff from buying exceeds the price. The second term, in square brackets, captures the impact of consumer conformity, which depends on consumer beliefs through ( ). For uninformed consumers, the second term is just equal to ( ). It is increasing in their optimism about the market size, in that ( ′ ) > ( ) holds whenever ′ firstorder stochastically dominate . For informed consumers, it is increasing in the realized value of the market size, but also in uninformed consumers' beliefs, via ( ). If uninformed consumers become more optimistic, they will increase their demand, which makes buying more attractive for informed consumers.
Total period t demand, ( , ) = ( , ) + ( , ), simplifies to
If all consumers are uninformed, α = 1, then eq. (13) reduces to = ( − )/(1 − ∫ 1 0 ′ ( ′ )), which resembles eq. (4) from Section 3. If all consumers are informed, α = 0, then eq. (13) reduces to = ( − )/(1− ), which is equivalent to eq. (6) from Section 3, when consumers inferred the true market size. In the absence of conformism, λ = 0, eqs (13), (6), and (4) all reduce to = ( − ), which is just the measure of consumers whose intrinsic payoff from buying exceeds the price.
Intuitively, demand is uniquely defined because the social payoff from buying is not 'too large' compared to the intrinsic payoff. Multiple equilibria could potentially exist if there were sufficiently strong strategic complementarities in consumers' purchase decisions. The assumption < 1 − ensures that such complementarities are not strong enough to completely overwhelm the intrinsic concern for the product displayed by all types. 18 This uniqueness is convenient as it ensures that each strategy chosen by the firm corresponds to a unique value of expected profits.
Having shown how consumer beliefs affect demand, I now consider how the firm's strategic choices can affect these beliefs. The firm would like to make uninformed consumers as optimistic as possible about the market size to encourage bandwagon behavior, but it cannot do so directly. Consumers fail to take into account how the firm's choice of price and capacity may be informative, so that period-1 consumers maintain their prior beliefs 1 = . However, the firm can indirectly influence period-2 consumers, who update their beliefs 2 after observing period-1 sales.
In order to state the formal result, I make the following definitions. For given, m∈ [0, 1] , let denote the beliefs that place probability one on m, and let + denote the prior beliefs F but left-truncated at m:
and
Period-2 consumers will update their beliefs to evaluated at the true market size, or to + evaluated at no less than the true market size, depending on the period-1 market outcome.
Lemma 2.
For given price 1 and capacity K, Consumers who observe excess period-1 capacity realize there is a unique level of demand consistent with period-1 sales, just as in Section 3. If demand had been slightly higher or lower, then they would have observed slightly higher or lower sales. Consumers also understand that demand is strictly increasing in m according to eq. (13), which they can use to infer the true market size. Consumers who observe a sellout only infer that the market is sufficiently large for demand to weakly exceed capacity at that price. Unlike in Section 3, a sellout reveals some, but not all, relevant information. It reveals that the market size exceeds a threshold value but leaves consumers uncertain about the extent of any excess demand. Selling out at a high price and capacity reveals more information, and results in a higher threshold, than selling out at a low price and capacity, by providing stronger evidence of high demand.
To solve for the firm's optimal strategy, define 0 ∈ (0, 1) implicitly as the value of m satisfying ( ) = ( ), given eqs (12) and (14). It is the market size which, if revealed to consumers, would give the same demand as under the prior. 19 Intuitively, a market size > 0 is 'good news', in that consumers who inferred that > 0 would adjust up their willingness to pay. Similarly, consumers would adjust down their willingness to pay if they inferred that < 0 .
I first consider a baseline setting where period-2 consumers directly observe period-1 demand, which allows them to infer the true market size even following a sellout. Comparing the firm's optimal strategy in the baseline with its optimal strategy when period-2 consumers only observe period-1 sales will reveal how the ability to mislead consumers can affect market outcomes.
Proposition 1.
Consider a baseline where demand 1 is publicly revealed after period 1. Then under both static and dynamic pricing, the firm will set price = /2 in both periods, along with capacity ≥ { 1 ( /2, ), 2 ( /2, )}. The probability of sellouts in both periods, ℙ( 1 = 2 = ), is equal to zero.
In the baseline, the firm cannot use sellouts to mislead consumers, so it simply sets its capacity to serve all demand in both periods. The optimal price = /2 follows from the multiplicative form of eq. (13). If < 0 , then willingness to pay drops over time, so demand drops as well, and the firm has excess capacity in period 2. If instead > 0 , then demand increases over time, so the firm has excess capacity in period 1. 20 The firm's incentives differ when period-2 consumers cannot directly observe period-1 demand, as sellouts can now mislead these consumers.
Proposition 2.
Under static pricing, the firm sets the same price as in the baseline, = /2. If > 0 , then it also sets the same capacity, ≥ 2 ( /2, ), and has excess capacity in period 1. If ≤ 0 , then it sets weakly lower capacity than in the baseline, = 1 ( /2, ), and sells out in both periods.
Proposition 2 generalizes the results from Section 3 to show that period-1 sellouts occur when demand is relatively low. Specifically, under static pricing, the firm uses sellouts to earn higher profits than in the baseline whenever the market is small enough that consumers would react negatively to learning its true size. The reason is that a sellout prevents demand from dropping over time, as it would following excess period-1 capacity. When selling out, the firm sets the same price as in the baseline, but now has a strict incentive to set capacity equal to period-1 demand. Doing so ensures that no period-1 consumers are rationed and that period-2 consumers overestimate the true market size. The result is that demand increases over time, even though sales cannot, and the firm faces excess period-2 demand.
The situation differs if the market is sufficiently large that consumers would react positively to learning its size. The firm then sets a high enough capacity to avoid a period-1 sellout, in order to reveal the market size to consumers, and to serve the subsequent increase in demand. It could have instead set capacity equal to period-1 demand to sell out and mislead consumers. Demand would then increase to an even greater extent, but the firm would be unable to translate this increased demand into increased sales, because its capacity constraint would bind.
A related way to understand Proposition 2 is that selling out in period 1 generates both a benefit and a cost. The benefit consists of concealing potentially unfavourable information from consumers, which increases subsequent demand by encouraging bandwagon behavior. 21 The cost is that the firm cannot increase sales following a sellout because of its limited capacity. The benefit is strictly positive for all m∈[0,1) if the firm sells out as in Proposition 2, since period-2 consumers then overestimate the market size with probability one. The cost is zero when < 0 because then sales would not have increased over time if the market size were revealed. In contrast, the cost is strictly positive when > 0 , and also outweighs the benefit under static pricing. 22 The difference under dynamic pricing is that the firm can take advantage of increased demand following a sellout by increasing its price. This reduces the cost of selling out in comparison with static pricing, and makes it more attractive to mislead consumers.
Proposition 3.
Under dynamic pricing, there exist 1 and 2 , with 0 < 1 < 2 < 1, such that:
, then the firm sets price and capacity as in the baseline, 1 = 2 = /2 and ≥ 2 ( /2, ), and has excess capacity in period 1.
(ii) If ≤ 1 , then the firm offers a period-1 price discount and charges a period-2 price premium, 1 < /2 < 2 , with = 1 ( 1 , ) = 2 ( 2 , + ), and sells out in both periods.
Moreover, for any ∈ ( 1 , 2 ], the firm will also set 1 , 2 , and K as in either (i) 
or (ii).
Sellouts now also occur when consumers would react somewhat positively to learning the true market size, 0 < ≤ 1 . Demand would then increase following excess capacity, but it increases by substantially more following a sellout, which consumers interpret as 'good news'. The firm's ability to increase its price over time then makes selling out optimal. As under static pricing, period-1 sellouts do not occur when demand is sufficiently high. A sellout would then only mislead consumers to a small extent, and the firm would particularly suffer from its inability to increase sales over time.
The firm sets its period-1 price to best exploit consumers' partial sophistication, so that they overestimate demand with probability one. The reason for a period-1 discount ( 1 < /2) compared with the baseline, and a period-2 premium ( 2 > /2), relates to the firm's intertemporal tradeoff in choosing capacity. To maximizes period-1 profits, the firm should set a low capacity to exactly meet period-1 demand at 1 = /2, but then a very high price 2 ≫ /2 is needed to avoid excess demand in period 2. To maximize period-2 profits, the firm should instead set a high capacity to exactly meet period-2 demand at price 2 = /2, but a very low price 1 ≪ /2 is then needed to sell out in period 1. The firm balances these concerns by setting capacity between these two levels, which results in introductory pricing, with a period-1 discount and a period-2 premium. 23, 24 Figure 1 further illustrates Propositions 2 and 3 by plotting profits as a function of the market size. 25 It depicts (i) the maximum profits the firm can earn, given a period-1 sellout, under static pricing, (ii) and under dynamic pricing; and (iii) the maximum profits the firm can earn, given excess period-1 capacity (i.e. baseline profits). The superscript so stands for sellout, and the superscript ec stands for excess capacity. I normalize all profits by dividing by m, both in Figure 1 and in the figures that follow. Doing so helps with the exposition but has no effect on the ranking of profits between (i), (ii), and (iii). Figure 1 shows that even under static pricing, the firm finds it profitable to sell out and mislead consumers for a wide variety of market sizes, ⪅ 0.51. The ability to engage in dynamic pricing further expands the circumstances under which selling out is optimal, to ⪅ 0.91. Moreover, under dynamic pricing, there is a unique market size below which it is optimal to sell out, and above which it is optimal to have excess capacity, just as under static pricing. Figure 2 presents normalized per-period profits, optimal prices, and optimal capacity, under dynamic pricing, given the same assumptions as in Figure 1 . The vertical dashed line in each panel gives the critical market size ≊ 0.91. Panel (a) shows that sellouts always lead to lower period-1 profits than having excess capacity. Sellouts give higher period-2 profits, as depicted in Panel (b), except when the market is so large that the cost of not increasing sales over time outweighs the benefit from misleading consumers. Panel (c) shows that the size of the period-1 discount and the period-2 premium associated with sellouts is increasing in market size. Finally, Panel (d) shows that the optimal capacity when selling out is often higher than demand in the baseline. The implication is that firms may sometimes want to sell out not by restricting capacity, but by combining a reasonably high capacity with a sufficiently low price.
I assume for the rest of the analysis that the firm can engage in dynamic pricing. In line with Figure 2 , the following result shows that the size of the period-1 discount and the period-2 premium are increasing in the market size. It also demonstrates how the discount and premium depend on the importance of the social payoff.
Proposition 4.
Consider dynamic pricing, and suppose that ∈ [0, 1 ), so that sellouts occur in both periods. Then the period-1 price is decreasing in the market size and the importance of the social payoff, whereas the period-2 price is increasing in these parameters, whenever the fraction of uninformed consumers is sufficiently large: there exists̄∈ (0, 1) such that
Both prices are decreasing in the discount factor: 1 < 0, 2 < 0 for all α∈ (0, 1] . Moreover, the ex-ante probability of selling out in both periods, ℙ( 1 = 2 = ), is increasing in δ and bounded below by ( 0 ) > 0.
Both the period-1 discount and the period-2 premium will tend to be large if the social payoff is important, as the firm then particularly benefits from misleading consumers. The proof of Proposition 4 shows more generally that the derivative of the period-1 and period-2 price have opposite sign, whether the derivative is taken with respect to m, λ, or α. It follows that a large period-1 discount should often precede a large period-2 premium.
An increase in the discount factor will instead result in a higher period-1 discount but a lower period-2 premium. This result also reflects the firm's intertemporal tradeoff when setting capacity. The optimal capacity is increasing in the discount factor, because demand increases following a sellout, and high capacity allows the firm to better take advantage of period-2 demand. Specifically, high capacity means that the firm must offer a large period-1 discount in order to sell out, but can serve all period-2 demand at close to the unconstrained optimal price, = /2.
A more patient firm has a higher incentive to mislead consumers by selling out, which generates costs in period 1 but benefits in period 2. Proposition 4 also shows that the probability of selling out in both periods remains strictly positive even as the discount factor, the importance of the social payoff, or the fraction of uninformed consumers tend to zero. In particular, the firm will always mislead consumers in situations where they would react negatively to learning the true market size.
To explore how the firm's strategic use of sellouts affects consumer welfare, I now compare expected payoffs, from an ex ante perspective, in Proposition 3 to those from the baseline in Proposition 1. Both intrinsic and social payoffs are included in the welfare calculations.
Proposition 5.
Consider expected payoffs from Proposition 3. Then compared to expected payoffs in the baseline:
(i) The firm earns higher expected profits.
(ii) All informed period-1 consumers and some uninformed period-1 consumers earn a higher expected payoff, but at least some period-2 consumers earn a strictly lower expected payoff.
(iii) If δ is sufficiently large, then all informed period-2 consumers and some uninformed period-2 consumers earn a higher expected payoff.
Equilibrium profits can be no lower than baseline profits, since the firm can always follow its baseline strategy. It can in fact do better still by setting price and capacity according to Proposition 3. Period-1 consumers then benefit from the period-1 discount, which makes buying cheaper and also leads others to buy, generating a higher social payoff.
Period-2 consumers instead face a price premium following a sellout and may overestimate demand. Some are misled into buying and are left worse off. However, the fact that they are misled benefits others by increasing the social payoff from buying. When the discount factor is large, the price premium is small, and its negative impact on consumers is dominated by the benefits of bandwagon behavior. All informed consumers are then better off than in the baseline, as are all uninformed consumers who would still have bought had they not been misled.
Formally, the statement of Proposition 5 allows δ to take on arbitrarily large values, including those greater than one. Such a high discount factor can be interpreted as the cumulative weight on post-period-1 profits in an analogous setting with more than two periods. Specifically, suppose that in each period t = 1,2,…,T, a measure m of consumers enter the market, observe all previous prices and sales, decide whether to buy, and then exit. The equilibrium outcome of this new game is identical to the one analyzed here, except the period-2 market outcome is repeated in all later periods, and the firm has ∑ =2 −1 as an effective discount factor. 27 A large value of T and a value of δ close to 1 in this new game would then correspond to ≫ 1 in the two-period model.
To address whether the strategic use of sellouts benefits consumers as a whole, Figure 3 plots consumer surplus, divided by m, as a function of the market size, under the same assumptions as Figure 1 . The proximity of both curves suggests that the overall impact of sellouts is quite small, but this hides substantial heterogeneity across different consumer groups. Further simulations suggest selling out will increase the surplus of both informed and uninformed consumers in period 1, compared to the baseline, but decrease that of both groups in period 2. The impact of strategic sellouts on consumer surplus can be divided into three effects. First, sellouts generate increased variability in pricing, compared to the baseline, which reduces consumer surplus. The period-2 premium dissuades consumers from buying precisely when demand is high and buying would yield a high social payoff. Second, sellouts mislead some uninformed period-2 consumers into buying, which reduces consumer surplus. Third, misleading some consumers into buying increases the social payoff of other buyers, which increases consumer surplus.
When the market is very large, the first effect (variability in pricing) dominates, and sellouts leave consumers worse off. The second and third effects are small because consumers do not sustantially overestimate demand following a sellout, so that being misled does little to change behavior. When the market is very small, sellouts again leave consumers worse off, but now because the second effect (misleading consumers into buying) dominates. The first effect is small because sellouts have little impact on pricing, as illustrated in Figure  2 , and so is the third effect, since a low market size implies a low social payoff regardless of consumer beliefs. Figure 4 shows that the third effect (increasing the social payoff) can dominate for a relatively large range of intermediate market size, so that sellouts lead to higher consumer surplus than in the baseline. Figure 4 also shows that the firm's interests are often broadly aligned with those of consumers, in terms of when sellouts leave them better off. For many values of the market size where sellouts lead to higher consumer surplus, they also leads to higher firm profits. This is the case approximately for all m∈ [0.22,0.91] . Interests are also broadly aligned when the market is sufficiently large, approximately for all m∈(0.91,1], as both consumers and the firm then benefit from excess capacity. As a result, equilibrium expected consumer surplus is higher than in the baseline, precisely because the firm can mislead consumers. The same applies to total surplus, which exceeds that in the baseline for almost all realizations of the market size.
Robustness
I now discuss the extent to which modifying certain assumptions might affect the results described in Section 4.
Consumers care about demand rather than quantity sold. Instead of assuming that consumers' willingness to pay is directly increasing in their beliefs about demand, an alternative would be to assume that willingness to pay was directly increasing in beliefs about sales. This assumption would effectively mean that consumers were not conformists, but that the product exhibited network effect. Demand may differ from sales if the firm is capacity constrained, so a natural question is whether the firm would still strategically use sellouts to mislead consumers.
With network effects, a period-1 sellout would still lead consumers to overestimate period-2 demand, and potentially increase their expected network payoff from buying. A difference compared with Section 4 is that restricting capacity would reduce this expected payoff by limiting sales. In particular, a capacity constraint would reduce the willingness to pay of period-1 consumers, who would reason that some of them might not be served. Period-2 consumers who observe a sellout would become more optimistic about demand, but may worry that high demand cannot translate into high sales. This would likely push the firm to set a higher price when restricting capacity, and also reduce the firm's incentive to sell out.
Capacity is a strategic choice. The firm's optimal strategy as described in Section 4 consists of a choice both of price and capacity, and generates sellouts when the market is small but not when it is large. These results would change if capacity was exogenous. Sellouts would no longer occur when the market was very small, relative to capacity, either because there would be too few consumers to sell out, or because selling out would require too large of a price discount. Sellouts would instead occur when the market was very large, simply because the firm could not serve all these consumers at its preferred price.
That being said, consumer inference following a sellout would remain unchanged, and the firm would still benefit from selling out as long as capacity was not too high. Specifically, suppose the firm would face a small amount of excess capacity if it charged the baseline price, given the realized market size. Then it would have an incentive to offer a small price discount so as to sell out and mislead consumers. It could then take advantage of the resulting increase in demand by charging a subsequent price premium.
Price commitment. The firm's optimal strategy does not depend on whether it can ex ante commit to a period-2 price, because this price has no impact on the willingness to pay of period-1 consumers. These consumers cannot buy at the period-2 price since they no longer remain in the market. Their social payoff from buying is also independent of the period-2 price, since it depends only on demand from consumers in their own cohort.
Price commitment could matter if period-1 consumers were willing and able to strategically delay their purchases. The firm might then want to commit to a higher period-2 price to discourage delay. Regarding incentives to delay, consumers could learn from observing the period-1 market outcome, but Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that they could also face a price increase (under dynamic pricing) or possible rationing (under static pricing). Whether consumers would have an incentive to delay would depend on how they evaluate this tradeoff, in particular given their partial sophistication.
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Price commitment would also matter if the social payoff for period-1 consumers depended in part on period-2 demand. The firm would then benefit from committing to a low period-2 price, which would increase the willingness to pay of consumers in period 1 by increasing their social payoff. However, the overall features of the analysis would remain unchanged. Given the period-1 market outcome, consumers' willingness to pay in period 2 would still be increasing in beliefs about the market size, and the firm could still use sellouts to mislead these consumers.
Firm uncertainty about demand. The assumption that the firm knows the exact period-1 demand can be relaxed, for example by adding a small amount of noise. Doing so will not change the main qualitative conclusions from Section 4 but will change two specific results: that period-1 sellouts can sometime occur for reasons unrelated to misleading consumers, i.e. in the baseline, and that sellouts under dynamic pricing are never accompanied by strictly positive excess demand.
Proposition 6.
Consider dynamic pricing, and let ε be an unobserved random variable with mean zero that follows an atomless distribution with full support on [−Δ, Δ] . Suppose that period-1 demand is 1 = 1 ( 1 , 1 ) + , and period 2 demand is 2 = 2 ( 2 , 2 ), with ( , ) given by eq. (13) (ii) Consider any ∈ [0, 1 ), for which Proposition 3 shows that the firm sells out in period 1: 1 ( 1 , ) = . In the limit as Δ tend to zero, the probability of strictly positive excess demand tends to one :
If the firm is uncertain about period-1 demand, then its only concern in the baseline is to serve as many consumers as possible, so the optimal capacity is almost surely higher than period-1 demand. The situation changes when consumers cannot directly observe demand, because they then form very different beliefs when demand is slightly below capacity than when it is slightly above. The firm is willing to accept a high probability of a small amount of excess demand to ensure that it sells out, so it can reap the benefits in the following period. This logic applies more broadly to situations where the firm is uncertain about demand but still knows more than certain consumers. If the firm could not mislead consumers, then demand uncertainty would lead it to increase capacity, to serve all demand in both periods. If instead the firm can mislead consumers through sellouts, then demand uncertainty can push its capacity choice in the opposite direction.
Conclusion
This paper helps provide a rationale as to why firms may point to past sellouts to promote future sales, in settings where conformist consumers care about product popularity. Specifically, it explores how observing a sellout may favorably influence consumer beliefs about demand and encourage bandwagon behavior. Consistent with evidence on limited strategic reasoning, I assume that consumers neglect how the firm's actions may reflect its private information when updating their beliefs, which raises the possibility that they may be mislead. Sellouts allow the firm to do just that, to mislead consumers into believing demand is higher than it truly is, by effectively withholding unfavorable information. This possibility to mislead consumers provides the firm with incentives to sell out when demand is low and can lead to introductory pricing. Sellouts hurt some consumers but help others, and can lead to higher overall consumer surplus.
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume for now that , , and take on values such that eqs (8) and (9) imply ∈ (−(1 − ), ) and ∈ (−(1 − ), ). Rearrange eq. (10) to obtain
and substitute into eq. (11) to give
Define ( ) ≡ /( ( − )), which is independent of m, since is independent of m, and since = ( − ). Write
Substituting eq. (18) into (16) yields
Substituting eq. (18) into (17) and solving for ( ) gives eq. (12), so
If ∈ [0, ), then eqs (18), (19), and (12), together with < 1 − and ≤ 1, imply 0 < + < ≤ 1. Looking at eqs (8) and (9), and again using < 1 − , confirms that ∈ (−(1 − ), ) and ∈ (−(1 − ), ), so demand is uniquely determined by eqs (18), (19), and (12). If instead ≥ , then demand is uniquely determined by = = 0. □
Proof of Lemma 2
Let f denote the pdf of F, and the pdf of , for t∈{1,2}. Bayes' rule implies
, where ℙ( , 1 | ) follows from the firm's equilibrium strategy. Consumers update beliefs according to Bayes' rule, except they use ℙ( , 1 | ) = ℙ( , 1 ). Substituting into eq. (20) yields 1 ( | , 1 ) = ( ), or equivalently 1 ( | , 1 ) = ( ), confirming that period-1 beliefs are given by the prior.
For period 2, Bayes' rule implies
with
, where ℙ( 2 | , , 1 , 1 ) follows from the firm's equilibrium strategy. Consumers update beliefs according to eq. (21) except they use ℙ( 2 | , , 1 , 1 ) = ℙ( 2 | , 1 , 1 ). Together with 1 ( | , 1 ) = ( ), this implies
where integrating gives the distribution function
. The probability ℙ( 1 | , , 1 ) follows from consumer equilibrium strategies and the firm's choice of K and 1 . Specifically, demand 1 ( 1 , ) is given by eq. (13), with sales 1 = { 1 , }. From eq. (13), 1 is strictly increasing in m, for any 1 < . Hence, for any 1 < and resulting 1 , there is a unique market size ( 1 , 1 ) consistent with this demand and price, which is increasing in 1 . The right-hand side of eq. (13) is strictly decreasing in 1 , so ( 1 , 1 ) is strictly increasing in 1 .
If 1 < , then consumers observe 1 = { 1 , } < , and they infer 1 = 1 . This implies ℙ( 1 | ′ , , 1 ) = 1 for ′ = ( 1 , 1 ) and ℙ( 1 | ′ , , 1 ) = 0 for all ′ ≠ ( 1 , 1 ), where ( 1 , 1 ) = , the true market size. Eq. (22) then reduces to , given by eq. (14), as required.
If 1 ≥ , then consumers observe 1 = { 1 , } = , and they infer 1 ≥ . This implies ℙ( 1 | ′ , , 1 ) = 1 for all ′ ≥ ( , 1 ) and ℙ( 1 | ′ , , 1 ) = 0 for all ′ < ( , 1 ). Eq. (22) then reduces to ( , 1 )+ , given by eq. (15), as required. The threshold ( , 1 ) is strictly increasing in 1 and K, since ( 1 , 1 ) is strictly increasing in both arguments. When = 1 , the threshold reduces to ( 1 , 1 ) = , the true market size. □
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose 1 is revealed after period 1. By the proof of Lemma 2, period-2 beliefs are then 2 = , which are independent of K, 1 , and 1 . Demand is 2 ( 2 , ), which by eq. (13) is proportional to ( − 2 ). Hence, period-2 profits, 2 = 2 2 ( 2 , ), are proportional to 2 ( − 2 ), provided that ≥ 2 ( 2 , ). Taking the first-order condition implies an optimal period-2 price of 2 = /2, provided that ≥ 2 ( /2, ). Period-2 profits are therefore 2 = 2 ( /2, ) /2 if ≥ 2 ( /2, ), and 2 < 2 ( /2, ) /2 if < 2 ( /2, ). They are independent of 1 .
Period-1 demand is 1 ( 1 , ), which by eq. (13) is proportional to ( − 1 ). Hence, period-1 profits, 1 = 1 1 ( 1 , ), are proportional to 1 ( − 1 ), provided that ≥ 1 ( 1 , ). Taking the first-order condition implies an optimal period-1 price of 1 = /2, provided that ≥ 1 ( /2, ). Period-1 profits are therefore 1 = 1 ( /2, ) /2 if ≥ 1 ( /2, ) and 1 < 1 ( /2, ) /2 if < 1 ( /2, ). Hence, the firm maximizes its objective function, eq. (2), by setting 1 = 2 = /2, with ≥ { 1 ( /2, ), 2 ( /2, )}. The firm can only sell out in both periods if = 0 , where 0 is the unique value of m for which 1 ( , ) = 2 ( , ). The probability that = 0 equals zero, since the market size is drawn from an atomless distribution. □
Proof of Proposition 2
Let denote the maximum profits the firm can earn given price and capacity that yield a period-1 sellout. Let denote the maximum profits it can earn given price and capacity that yield excess period-1 capacity. Specifically, by eq. (2), 1 = and Lemma 2, write
where static pricing gives the additional constraint 1 = 2 ≡ . Demand in eq. (23) is identical to that in the baseline, so Proposition 1 implies
which the firm earns by setting = /2, with ≥ { 1 ( /2, ), 2 ( /2, )}. From eq. (24), write = ( + { 2 ( , 2 ), }), where 2 = ( , )+ . If 1 ( , ) > and 1 ( 2 , 2 ) > , then = (1+ ). Deviating to + , for ε > 0 but small, then yields strictly higher profits, = ( + ) (1+ ) > , so 1 ( , ) > and 1 ( 2 , 2 ) > cannot be optimal. If 1 ( , ) > and 2 ( , 2 ) ≤ , then = ( + 2 ( , ( , )+ )). Deviating to capacity + , for ε > 0 but small, yields profits = ( + + { 2 ( , ( + , )+ ), + }). To establish > , I now show that 2 ( , ( + , )+ ) > 2 ( , ( , )+ ). Notice first that Lemma 2 implies ( , ) < ( + , ). Setting = ( , )+ in eq. (12) gives
The expression in each integral is positive and increasing in m , and eq. (15) Eq. (13) shows that 1 ( , ) is proportional to ( − ), so the firm maximizes profits when selling out by setting = /2, and = 1 ( , ), to earn = 2 1 ( /2, )(1 + ). Comparing = 2 1 ( /2, )(1 + ) with = 2 ( 1 ( /2, ) + 2 ( /2, ) yields ≥ if and only if 1 ( /2, ) ≥ 2 ( /2, ). Recall that 0 ∈ (0, 1) is defined as the value of m satisfying ( ) = ( ), and that ( ) = 1/(1 − ) is strictly increasing in m. Thus, from eq. (13), it follows that ≥ if and only if ≤ 0 . □
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider eqs (23) and (24) from the proof of Proposition 2, where once again, demand in eq. (23) is identical to that in the baseline. This implies that is given by eq. (25), which the firm earns by setting 1 = 2 = /2, with ≥ { 1 ( /2, ), 2 ( /2, )}.
Deviating to 2 + , for ε > 0 but small, then yields strictly higher profits, = 1 1 + ( 2 + ) > . It follows that the firm sets 2 ( 2 , 2 ) ≤ . If 2 ( 2 , 2 ) ≤ and 1 ( 1 , ) > , then = 1 + 2 ( 2 , ( , 1 )+ ) 2 . Deviating to 1 + , for ε > 0 but small, yields = ( 1 + ) + { 2 ( 2 , ( , 1 + )+ ), } 2 . To establish > , it is sufficient to show that 2 ( 2 , ( , 1 + )+ ) > 2 ( 2 , ( , 1 )+ ). Notice that Lemma 2 implies ( , 1 ) < ( , 1 + ). Thus, the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 that showed ( ( + , )+ ) > ( ( , )+ ), also implies ( ( , 1 + )+ ) > ( ( , 1 )+ ). Combined with eq. (13), this yields 2 ( 2 , ( , 1 + )+ ) > 2 ( 2 , ( , 1 )+ ). It follows that the firm sets 1 ( 1 , ) = .
Hence, profits from selling out are = 1 ( 1 , ) 1 + 2 ( 2 , + ) 2 , where 1 ( 1 , ) = and 2 ( 2 , + ) ≤ . I now show that 2 ( 2 , + ) = . Suppose instead that 2 ( 2 , + ) < . Then by eq. (13), the firm must set 2 = /2, to maximize period-2 profits, 2 ( 2 , + ) 2 . The inequality 1 ( 1 , ) > 2 ( /2, + ) then implies 1 < /2. This is because ( , ) < ( , + ) for all m > 0, by = 0+ from eq. (15), and by ( , + ).
Moreover, 1 < /2 implies 1 1 ( 1 , ) 1 > 0, by eq. (13). Write = 1 ( 1 , ) 1 + 2 ( /2, + )( 2 ), where
. Now suppose the firm deviates to period-1 price 1 + and capacity 1 ( 1 + , ) > 2 ( /2, + ), for ε > 0 but small. This deviation yields = 1 ( 1 + , )( 1 + )+ 2 ( /2, + )( 2 ) > , by 1 1 ( 1 , ) 1 > 0. It follows that the firm will set 1 ( 1 , ) = 2 ( 2 , + ) = , so that
evaluated at the optimal K. To solve for this optimal capacity, and by extension the corresponding prices, define
using eq. (13), which are independent of price. Substituting eqs (27) and (28) into eq. (26) gives
where differentiating with respect to K yields optimal capacity
Profits are therefore defined by eqs (26) and (29). Differentiating eq. (29) with respect to δ and simplifying yields
which is strictly positive, since ( + ) > ( ) implies ( + ) > ( ). Hence, eq. (29) is strictly increasing in the discount factor, tending to ( )( /2) as δ approaches zero and to ( + )( /2) as δ approaches infinity. Equations (27) and (28) therefore imply 1 ( /2, ) < < 2 ( /2, + ) for all δ > 0. This is equivalent to 1 < /2 < 2 , by 1 ( 1 , ) = 2 ( 2 , + ) = .
To complete the proof, it remains to show that there exists 1 and 2 , with 0 < 1 < 2 < 1, such that > for all ∈ [0, 1 ], and > for all ∈ ( 2 , 1]. Recall 0 is defined by ( 0 ) = ( ), from eqs (12) and (14), or equivalently by 1 ( , ) = 2 ( , 0 ). Suppose ≤ 0 . In this case, 1 ( , ) ≥ 2 ( , ), so that eq. (25) implies ≤ 1 ( /2, ) /2 + 1 ( /2, ) /2. Now say the firm sets 1 = 2 = /2 and = 1 ( /2, ). Then it earns 1 ( /2, ) /2 + 1 ( /2, ) /2, which is strictly less than , since the optimal prices when selling out satisfy 1 < /2 < 2 . It follows that > . Moreover, both and are continuous in m, so there exists 1 > 0 such that > for all ∈ [0, 1 ]. Now suppose m = 1. In this case, = 1 ( /2, ) /2 + 2 ( /2, =1 ) /2 and = 1 ( 1 , ) 1 + 2 ( 2 , ( =1)+ ) 2 , with 1 < /2 < 2 . Equations (14) and (15) imply =1 = ( =1)+ . Moreover, eq. (13) shows that 1 ( 1 , ) 1 and 2 ( 2 , =1 ) 2 have a unique maximum at 1 = /2 and 2 = /2. It follows that > when m = 1, by 1 < /2 < 2 . Both and are continuous in m, so there exists 2 < 1 such that > for all ∈ ( 2 , 1]. □
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose ∈ [0, 1 ), so that > . Proposition 3 shows that the equilibrium prices, under dynamic pricing, satisfy 1 ( 1 , ) = 2 ( 2 , + ) = , given eqs (27), (28), and (29) . I now vary various parameters and demonstrate the impact on these equilibrium prices. In particular, we have = for t∈{1,2}. Clearly, < 0 for t∈{1,2}, since 1 ( , ) and 2 ( , + ) are both decreasing in p. Since > 0 by eq. (30), it follows that 1 < 0 and 2 < 0.
Write 1 = − ( ) and 2 = − ( + ) , by eqs (27) and (28). Using eq. (29) to substitute for K in these expressions gives
which immediately yields
Suppose α = 1. In this case, eqs (27) and (28) imply C(F) = mX(F) and ( + ) = ( + ), so that
Setting α = 1 in eq. (12) 
which is strictly negative by ( | + ) > ( | ). It follows that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0 when evaluated at α = 1.
All expressions are continuous in α, so there exists̄∈ (0, 1) such that 1 < 0, 1 < 0, 2 > 0, and 2 > 0 for all ∈ (, 1].
To establish ℙ( 1 = 2 = ) > 0, I need to show that > when evaluated at m such that = , with and given by eqs (25), (26) and (29). Such an m exists since > for ∈ [0, 1 ) and < for ∈ ( 2 , 1], and since both and are continuous in m. Moreover,
From eq. (25), write
From eq. (26), write
The envelope theorem implies = 0 at the optimal capacity, eq. (29), so that
Comparing eqs (32) with (33) shows
where = 1 ( 1 , ) = 2 ( 2 , + ). The first expression in large brackets is strictly negative, since 1 < /2, and since 1 ( , ) has a unique maximum at = /2. It then follows from δ > 0 that 2 − 2 2 ( /2, ) > 0, and hence > , as required. □
Proof of Proposition 5
Expected profits from Proposition 3 are ∫ . To establish the results for consumer payoffs, it is sufficient to consider values of m for which > , since otherwise the firm sets the baseline price and capacity. First consider period-1 consumers. Proposition 3 shows that 1 < /2, with 1 ( 1 , ) = 1 ( 1 , ) = . By eq. (1), a type θ consumer earns + 1 ( 1 , ) − 1 from buying. She buys when + 1 ( 1 , ) − 1 ≥ 0 if informed, and when + ∫ 1 0 1 ( 1 , ) − 1 ≥ 0 if uninformed. In the baseline, a type θ consumer earns + 1 ( /2, )− /2 from buying. She buys when + 1 ( /2, )− /2 ≥ 0 if informed, and when + ∫ 1 0 1 ( /2, ) − /2 ≥ 0 if uninformed. Hence, 1 < /2 and 1 ( 1 , ) < 0 imply that all consumers who buy in the baseline also buy according to Proposition 3, and earn a strictly higher payoff. Informed consumers who do not buy in the baseline cannot earn less according to Proposition 3, as they will only buy if their payoff exceeds zero. Now consider period-2 consumers. Proposition 3 shows that 2 > /2, with 2 ( 2 , + ) = 2 ( 2 , + ) = . An uninformed type θ consumer earns + 2 ( 2 , + ) − 2 from buying, and she buys if + ∫ + . Thus, for l sufficiently large, type + will only buy when ′ + + 2 ( 2 , + ) − 2 < 0. She therefore earns a negative expected payoff, taken over all m such that > , whereas her payoff in the baseline is bounded below by zero.
Notes
1 The study of bandwagon effects in consumption dates back to Leibenstein (1950) . By bandwagon behavior, I refer to a situation where consumers become more willing to buy a product if they expect others to buy as well. 2 For example, see the numerous online discussion threads on hfboards.hockeysfuture.com. 3 See "The Red Sox nurture a 'Sellout' Streak" (BusinessWeek, July 29, 2010). 4 'Noma' in Copenhagen typically only opened up bookings, at regular intervals, for dates up to three months in advance. Most customers enquiring about reservations only learned that all tables were booked for that period. 5 For example, about half of the tickets for Lorde's 2017 New Zealand shows were reportedly offered via presale, and sold out before ticket sales opened to the general public. Coldplay sold out a limited number of early-bird tickets, at reduced prices, for their appearance at the Global Citizen Festival in India, after which the remaining tickets were put on sale. See http://www.stuff.co.nz/entertainment/music/93682882/lorde-sells-out-nz-presale-in-less-than-10-minutes and http://indianexpress.com/article/entertainment/music/coldplay-fans-tickets-5000-3032155/ respectively, both accessed on March 5, 2018. 6 Capacity is certainly a choice variable for restaurants and various performances. Owners of professional sports teams may have less discretion over capacity, but still face a periodic choice of whether to expand seating. 7 See "Red Sox Ticket Policy Keeps Sellout Streak Alive With Resellers" (www.bloomberg.com, July 30, 2010). 8 Weigand (1999) relates that a major Broadway producer who advertised sellouts at every performance actually bought many tickets himself, and gave them to charities to fill empty seats. He also describes free tickets being given away for shows from comedian Jerry Seinfeld, and argues that 'although Seinfeld's managers may never have heard of Gary Becker, they probably knew that full houses say one thing, and a lot of empty seats say another' (p. 57). 9 I separately consider both static pricing and dynamic pricing in the analysis. 10 Quality uncertainty is likely less relevant in situations where consumers can view detailed product information, such as restaurant or concert reviews. 11 For example, customers looking to buy a car might directly observe the number of vehicles on a dealer's lot. Broadly consistent with the theoretical framework of Stock and Balachander (2005) , this initial inventory can be strategically chosen by the dealer, unsold inventory is carried over into the future, and the dealer may face constraints in quickly adjusting inventory over time (e.g. Cachon, Gallino, and Olivares (2013) point to imperfect dealer control over which particular sub-models they receive and to shocks at upstream production plants). 12 For related models of coarse reasoning, see Esponda (2008) and Jehiel and Koessler (2008) , along with Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer (2008) and Ettinger and Jehiel (2010) for applications to persuasion and deception. 13 Linearity of the social payoff and the uniform distribution of type will help me derive explicit expressions for demand and for the firm's optimal price and capacity, but are not crucial for the qualitative results. 14 Whether or not the firm can commit to 2 at t = 1 is irrelevant in this setting, as described in Section 5. 15 The papers surveyed in Section 1 looking at scarcity and quality uncertainty also abstract away from the possibility of strategic delay, as does the vast majority of work on social learning (see, e.g., Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Bose, Orosel, Ottaviani, and Vesterlund 2006; Bose, Orosel, Ottaviani, and Vesterlund 2008; Callander and Hörner 2009) . 16 For this example, I depart from the assumption that the market size is drawn from an atomless distribution. A consequence is that demand will not strictly increase following a sellout, as in Section 4. However, sellouts will still serve to hide unfavorable information from consumers, which is what drives their use in the general analysis. 17 The same logic would hold if the social payoff from buying in period 2 depended directly on period-1 demand, or depended directly on the market size. The key point is that consumers who observed a sellout in period-1 would overestimate the social payoff from buying in period 2. 18 A related explanation for uniqueness is the presence of consumers whose incentive to buy does not depend on the actions of others. The highest type, θ = A, will buy regardless of whether others do the same, at the firm's optimal price. Moreover, the lowest type, = −(1 − ), will not buy even if all others do. The presence of these types also rules out corner solutions where either all consumers buy or none of them do. 19 A unique such 0 exists, since ( ) is continuous and increasing in m, with ( =0 ) < ( ) < ( =1 ). 20 The fact that the optimal capacity in the baseline is not unique follows from the assumption that capacity is costless. If capacity costs were strictly increasing in K, then the firm would optimally set capacity to exactly equal either period-1 demand (if ≤ 0 ) or period-2 demand (if > 0 ). 21 The idea that firms may act strategically to prevent consumers from learning unfavourable information can also be found in the literature on obfuscation. Much of this work has explored how firms may directly withhold information about add-on pricing (see, e.g. Gabaix and Laibson 2006; Kosfeld and Schuwer 2011; Armstrong and Vickers 2012; Dahremoller 2013; Heidhues, Koszegi, and Murooka 2016a; Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Murooka 2016b) , whereas I show a firm may indirectly withhold information from consumers about each others' behavior, through its choice of price and capacity. 22 The precise magnitude of these costs and benefits depends on how consumers update beliefs, given their partial sophistication. However, the connection between sellouts and low demand would remain if consumers simply reacted to period-1 sales based on a rule of thumb, as long as they (i) react negatively to sufficiently low sales and excess capacity, and (ii) react more positively to a sellout than to observing the same number of sales with excess capacity. 23 Other possible reasons for introductory pricing include compensating consumers who buy before they learn their true valuation (Möller and Watanabe 2010; Nocke, Peitz, and Rosar 2011) , or exploiting network effects, for example by helping a firm establish its base before a rival (Katz and Shapiro 1986) . 24 The same logic would apply if the firm could increase its capacity over time at a cost, although this would reduce the size of the price discount and premium. If the firm could costlessly increase capacity, then it would set 1 = 2 = /2 and sell out for all values of the market size. Allowing the firm to carry over any excess capacity in period 1 to serve consumers in period 2 would have no impact on pricing or profits. 25 Specifically, I assume for Figure 1 that m is drawn from U(0,1), and that = 3/4, = = 1/2, and δ = 1. 26 Proposition 3 does not specify that such a unique market size must always exist under dynamic pricing. However, simulations carried out for a wide range of parameter values, with m drawn from U(0,1), all show such a unique value, 1 = 2 . I have also shown analytically that 1 = 2 always holds if m is drawn from U(0,1) and all consumers are uninformed. This result is available upon request. 27 Selling out according to Proposition 3 already misleads consumers to the maximum possible extent. The best the firm can do in any period ≥ 2 is to maximize period-t profits and maintain these same beliefs into period + 1, which it can accomplish by setting = 2 , so that demand equals capacity.
